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Abstract. We study the computational complexity of controlling
the result of an election by breaking ties strategically. This problem
is equivalent to the problem of deciding the winner of an election
under parallel universes tie-breaking. When the chair of the election
is only asked to break ties to choose between one of the co-winners,
the problem is trivially easy. However, in multi-round elections, we
prove that it can be NP-hard for the chair to compute how to break
ties to ensure a given result. Additionally, we show that the form of
the tie-breaking function can increase the opportunities for control.
Indeed, we prove that it can be NP-hard to control an election by
breaking ties even with a two-stage voting rule.
1 INTRODUCTION
Voting is a general mechanism to combine individual orderings into
a group preference (e.g. preferences of agents over different plans,
or rankings of web pages by different search engines). One concern
that the individual agents may have is that the chair may manipulate
the result. For example, the chair might introduce a spoiler candidate
or delete some votes. Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [6] explored an in-
teresting barrier to such manipulation; perhaps it is computationally
too difficult for the chair to work out how to perform such control?
They proved that many types of control problems are NP-hard even
for simple voting rules like plurality.
Interestingly, one type of control not considered by Bartholdi,
Tovey and Trick is control by choosing how ties are broken. This
is surprising since the chair is actually the person who breaks ties in
many elections. For example, the Speaker in many parliaments has
the casting vote in case of a tied vote. Another reason to consider
such control is that in many elections the tie breaking rule is unspec-
ified or is left ambiguous. The chair therefore has an opportunity to
influence the outcome by selecting a beneficial (to him) rule.
This control problem also avoids one of the criticisms raised
against the analysis of some of the other forms of control. In particu-
lar, many complexity results about control suppose that the chair has
complete knowledge of the votes. This might be considered unrea-
sonable. For example, how do we know how voters will rank a new
spoiler candidate till their candidature has been announced? When
studying control by breaking ties, it is natural to suppose the chair
knows how the votes are cast when asked to break a tie.
Control by tie-breaking is equivalent to the problem of determin-
ing if a chosen alternative can win under some tie-breaking rule, an
idea known as parallel universes tie-breaking (PUT) [9]. As PUT
does not instantiate a particular tie-breaking rule, but rather the set of
all tie-breaking rules, there is no longer a dependency on the names
of the individual candidates. This property, known as neutrality, can
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be restored under PUT whereas tie-breaking off a lexicographical
ordering does not allow for neutrality in the final resolute voting
rule [28]. Deciding if a candidate is the winner of such a neutral
rule with ranked pairs voting has recently been shown to be NP-
complete [8]; it follows that control by tie-breaking is NP-complete.
Winner determination under is PUT is also closely related to deter-
mining if a given alternative has a chance to win in the presence of
certain types of uncertain information [3, 33]
Tie-breaking has played an important role in some of the earliest
literature on computational social choice. For example, Bartholdi,
Tovey and Trick [5] proved that a single agent can manipulate
a Copeland election in polynomial time when ties are broken in
favour of the manipulators, but manipulation becomes NP-hard when
the tie-breaking rule used in chess competitions is employed. With
Copeland voting, Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Schnoor [15]
proved that the choice of how ties are scored can change the compu-
tational complexity of computing a manipulation from polynomial to
NP-hard. More recently work by Obraztsova, Elkind and Hazon [24]
and Aziz et al. [2] considered the impact of different randomized tie-
breaking schemes on the computational complexity of computing a
manipulation. They proved, for example, that all scoring rules are
polynomial to manipulate for some tie-breaking rules but not others;
additionally rules like maximin, STV and ranked pairs are NP-hard.
In this paper, we study the computational complexity of control by
breaking ties. While ties in a real elections may not be that common,
they have been observed. For instance, US Vice Presidents have had
to cast tie-breaking votes in 244 Senate votes. Indeed John Adams,
the first Vice President, cast 29 such votes. Often elections that are
not closely contested cannot be manipulated [32] and therefore, tied
elections being the most closely contested of all, represent an inter-
esting edge case that has not been greatly investigated. We show that
when the chair only breaks ties to choose between co-winners, as is
the case in many single round rules, control by tie-breaking is poly-
nomial. On the other hand, for many multi-round rules like Coombs,
Cup, and STV, the chair may have to break multiple ties, and the con-
trol by tie-breaking problem is NP-complete. Even with two-stage
rules, where the chair may have to break ties only twice, the control
by tie-breaking problem can be NP-complete.
2 FORMAL BACKGROUND
An election is defined by a set of candidates C with |C|= m, a profile
P which is a set of n strict linear orders (votes) over C, and a voting
correspondence R. Let R be a function R : P→W mapping a profile
onto a set of co-winners where W ⊆ C. If |W | = 1 then we have a
voting rule, otherwise we may require a tie-breaking rule T that will
return a unique winner (single element) from W . Let N(i, j) be the
number of voters preferring i to j. We consider the following voting
rules in this study [1].
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Scoring rules: (w1, . . . ,wm) is a vector of weights where the ith can-
didate in a vote scores wi, and the co-winners are the candidates
with highest total score. Plurality has w1 = 1, and wi = 0 for i> 1;
veto has wi = 1 for i < m, and wm = 0, ; k-approval has wi = 1 for
i≤ k, and wi = 0 for i > k; Borda has wi = m− i.
Plurality with runoff: If one candidate has a majority, then she
wins. Otherwise we eliminate all but the two candidates with the
most votes and apply the plurality rule.
Black’s Rule: If one candidate is the Condorcet winner, a candidate
preferred by a majority of voters to all others, then she wins. Oth-
erwise, we apply the Borda rule.
Bucklin: The Bucklin score of a candidate is his k-approval score
with k set to be the smallest value such that the k-approval score
of at least one candidate exceeds bn/2c. The co-winners are the
candidates with the largest Bucklin score. The simplified Bucklin
procedure is the same except that all candidates with score exceed-
ing bn/2c are co-winners.
Fallback: This is a combination of Bucklin and approval voting.
Voters approve and rank a subset of the candidates. If there is a k
such that the k-approval score of at least one candidate, the sum of
the approvals appearing in the first k places of each voter’s ranked
order, exceeds bn/2c then the co-winners are the set of candidates
exceeding this threshold. If there is no such k (as no candidate
receives enough approvals), the winner is the approval winner.
Single Transferable Vote (STV): This rule requires up to m− 1
rounds. In each round, the candidate with the least number of
voters ranking him first is eliminated until one of the remaining
candidates has a majority.
Nanson and Baldwin: These are elimination versions of Borda vot-
ing. In each round of Nanson, we eliminate all candidates with
less than the average Borda score. In each round of Baldwin, we
eliminate the candidate with the lowest Borda score.
Coombs: This is the elimination version of veto voting. In each
round, we eliminate the candidate with the lowest veto score until
we have one candidate with a plurality score of n/2 or greater. In
the simplified version of Coombs, we eliminate the candidate with
the lowest veto score until one candidate remains.
Cup: Given a schedule S and a labeling L, we run a knockout tourna-
ment. Candidates are compared pairwise with the winner in each
moving to the next round. The overall winner is the candidate to
win the final matchup round.
Copelandα : The candidates with the highest Copelandα score win.
The Copelandα score of candidate i is ∑ j 6=i(N(i, j) > n2 ) +
α(∑ j 6=i(N(i, j) = n2 )). In the second order Copeland rule, if there
is a tie, the winner is the candidate whose defeated competitors
have the largest sum of Copeland scores.
Ranked pairs: We consider all pairs of candidates in order of the
pairwise margin of victory, from greatest to least. For each con-
sidered pair, we construct an ordering which ranks these candi-
dates unless it creates a cycle. The winner is the candidate at the
top of the constructed ordering. For a non-neutral variant, when
there are two or more pairwise relations with the same amount
of support, we resolve ties according to an outside ordering. For a
neutral variant, the co-winners are any candidate who can be made
top element under some tie breaking order [8].
Maximin: The Maximin score of a candidate is the number of votes
received in his worst pairwise election. The co-winners are the
candidates with the largest such score.
Schulze Method: The Schulze ranking [27] of candidates is com-
puted from the pairwise majority graph where an edge between
candidates i and j is weighted by N(i, j). A beatpath score is com-
puted for all candidates, which is the maximum weight path to
all other candidates. The winning set is the set of candidates with
highest beathpath scores.
Kemeny-Young: The Kemeny-Young rule selects the ranking with
maximal Kemeny score [19, 34]. The Kemeny score of a ranking
is measured by summing, for each candidate pair i, j ∈C, N(i, j).
Finding the ranking(s) with highest Kemeny score(s) is computa-
tional hard to compute when m≥ 4 [7, 18].
A tie-breaking rule T for an election is a single valued choice func-
tion that, for any subset W ⊆C, W 6= /0, and profile P, T (P,W ) returns
a single element c∈W [24]. Commonly, T is a strict linear order over
C that is provided aprori (e.g. by age or alphabetically). However, this
definition allows us to represent functions that are not necessarily a
linear order over the candidate set. This includes functions that are
not transitive for all the candidates, and, while this can be seen as an
undesirable propriety in elections, it is a common element in sports
competitions (e.g., NCAA Football) where aspects like goal differ-
ential and total points scored are used as non-transitive tie-breaking
functions. We consider the following decision problem.
Name: CONTROL BY TIE-BREAKING
Question: Given profile P and preferred candidate p ∈C, is there a
tie-breaking rule T such that p can be made the unique winner of the
election under voting rule R?
A voting rule is vulnerable to such control if this problem is poly-
nomial, and resistant if it is NP-hard. All voting rules that require
tie-breaking at some point, which includes all voting rules presented
in this section, are susceptible to this form of control.
In the manipulation problem [6], we wish to decide if we can cast
one additional vote to make p win. All our results here apply to the
variants of the manipulation problem in which we break ties in favour
of or against the manipulator. Finally, in the manipulation problem
with random tie-breaking [2, 24], we are also given a probability t
and we wish to decide if we can cast one additional vote to make
p the winner with probability at least t supposing ties are broken
uniformly at random between candidates.
3 RELATIONSHIP TO MANIPULATION
We start by considering how control by breaking ties is related to
other manipulation problems. A little surprisingly, the complexity
of control by breaking ties is not related to that of the manipula-
tion problem with random tie-breaking or the standard manipulation
problem when ties are broken in a fixed order.
Theorem 1 There exists a voting correspondence such that the con-
trol by tie-breaking problem is polynomial but the manipulation
problem with random tie-breaking is NP-complete (and vice versa).
Proof. In Corollary 2, we prove that the control by tie-breaking
problem for Copeland is polynomial. On the other hand, Obraztsova
and Elkind [23] prove that the manipulation problem with random
tie-breaking for Copeland is NP-complete.
Consider the voting rule that eliminates half the candidates using
the veto rule, then elects the plurality winner. In Theorem 9, we prove
that the control by tie-breaking problem for this rule is NP-complete.
However, the manipulation problem with random tie-breaking for
this rule is polynomial since we can exhaustively try all m(m−1)/2
votes with different candidates in the first and the last position. 
Theorem 2 There exists a voting correspondence such that the con-
trol by tie-breaking problem is polynomial but the manipulation
problem is NP-complete (and vice versa).
Proof. In Theorem 3, we prove that the control by tie-breaking
problem for Nanson is polynomial. On the other hand, the manipula-
tion problem for Nanson is NP-complete [22].
Consider again the voting rule that eliminates half the candidates
using the veto rule, then elects the plurality winner. In Theorem 9,
we prove that the control by tie-breaking problem for this rule is NP-
complete. However, the manipulation problem is polynomial since
we can exhaustively try all m(m− 1)/2 votes with different candi-
dates in first and last position. 
4 SELECTING FROM THEWINNING SET
We start with some very simple cases. When tie-breaking only ever
takes place once and at the end, then the chair is choosing between
the co-winners. In such cases, control by breaking ties is trivially
polynomial. The chair can ensure a candidate p wins if and only if p
is amongst the co-winners.
Theorem 3 The control by tie-breaking problem when we select
from among a set of co-winners once is polynomial.
Theorem 3 covers the majority of voting rules presented in Sec-
tion 2. Specifically, control by tie-breaking is easy for:
• All scoring rules, Bucklin, Black, maximin, and Copelandα for
any α are polynomial.
• Plurality with runoff is polynomial since only O(m) candidates
can enter the runoff with the candidate we wish to win, so we can
try all possibilities.
• Fallback is polynomial, this is interesting as it holds the current
record of resistance to 20 of the 22 methods of control [26].
• Nanson’s rule is a multi-round rule where manipulation is NP-
complete [22]. However, control by tie-breaking is polynomial.
Since Nanson’s rule eliminates all alternatives with less than the
average Borda score, the only time that it breaks ties is in the final
round when multiple candidates have the maximal Borda score.
• Schulze Method is also polynomial. In the two common imple-
mentations, edge(s) between candidate i and j is either N(i, j) or
the margin of votes N(i, j)−N( j, i). In the former case, even if
these numbers are tied it does not imply a tie in the outcome or-
dering of i and j. In the latter case, if there is a tie then the edge
appears in the graph with 0 weight. The only possible tie in the
method occurs when two candidates have the same beatpath score.
Officially Schulze rule requires that an order is drawn at random
from P and ties are resolved according to this order. If we assume
the chair can select a ballot then he just selects the ballot that is
closest to his true preference.
• For the Kemeny-Young method with m≤ 3, the only ties that can
occur are between pairs of elements in the outcome ordering, we
need to select a resolution of these pairs such that p wins. This can
be computed in polynomial time through brute force computation
as the number of possible resolutions of the pairwise ties is poly-
nomial. Note that the problem is trivially hard for instances where
m≥ 4.
To have any resistance to control by tie-breaking, we need more
complex tie-breaking. One place to see more complexity is with
multi-round rules like STV and Coombs in which candidates are suc-
cessively eliminated. Such rules increase the number of times ties
may need to be broken.
The Copeland rule offers another interesting control opportunity
for the chair. The chair might be in a position to set α , the score that
a candidate receives in the event of a tie in the tournament graph.
The choice of α has an impact on the computational complexity of
computing a manipulation [14,15]. What happens when we hand the
choice of α over to the manipulator? He just needs to find ∀c ∈C :
wins(p)+α · ties(p) ≥ wins(c)+α · ties(c). Where wins(p) is the
number of points received for wins and ties is the number of points
received for tied competitions. Since α must be a rational number
between 0≤α ≤ 1 we can find it quickly with a short linear program.
Theorem 4 The control problem of setting α for Copelandα is poly-
nomial.
5 BREAKING TIES DURING EXECUTION
We now move to multi-round voting rules. Bartholdi and Orlin [4]
showed that the manipulation problem for STV is NP-complete;
Conitzer et al. [9] showed that the winner determination under PUT
for STV, and therefore control by tie-breaking, is NP-complete.
5.1 Baldwin and Coombs rules
We next consider Baldwin and Coombs’s voting rules. These are
multi-round rules that successively eliminate candidates based on
their Borda or Veto scores, respectively. The manipulation problem
for Baldwin’s rule is NP-complete and we can modify the proof given
by Narodytska et al. [22].
Theorem 5 The control by tie-breaking problem for Baldwin’s rule
is NP-complete.
Proof. (Sketch) We modify the NP-completeness proof for Baldwin
manipulation [22] to move the burden of finding the exact cover from
the manipulator and onto the tie-breaking rule. The chair will set the
tie-breaking order such that we select exactly a subset of sets that
give us an exact cover in an instance of EXACT COVER BY 3 SETS
(X3C). Given two sets V = {v1, . . . ,vq}, q = 3t, and S = {S1, . . . ,St},
where t ≥ 2 and for all j ≤ t, |S j| = 3, and S j ⊆ V we create an in-
stance with the set of candidates C = {p,d,b}∪V ∪A. Note that p
is the preferred candidate, members of A = {a1, . . . ,at} correspond
to the 3-sets in S, and m = |C|= q+ t +3. The construction is made
up of two parts. The first set of votes P1 remains unchanged from
Narodytska et al. [22] and is used to control changes in the score dif-
ference between candidates as they are eliminated. The second set of
votes P2, which are the votes that set the initial score differences be-
tween the candidates, are modified so that the dangerous candidates
are tied with p (rather than having one more vote than p).
We will make use of the votes W(u,v) = {(u  v 
Others),(rev(Others)  u  v)}, where Others are all the can-
didates in C \ {u,v} in lexicographical order. Votes of this form (1)
give m points to u, m− 2 points to v, and m− 1 points to all other
candidates; and (2) have the property that for any set of candidates
C′ ⊆ C and any pair of candidates x,y ∈ C \C′ if x = v and u is
removed, the score of v to increase by 1, if x = u and v is removed,
the score of u decreases by 1, otherwise the scores are unchanged.
These votes allow us to construct a profile such that removing
candidates in a particular order creates ties in the next round.
The set of votes P1 is the machinery that creates a series of ties that
we must select from and is unchanged from Narodytska et al. [22].
Let sbase(P1) = m(6mt +mq+m(t +6)).
The votes in P1 are:
• for each j ≤ t and each vi ∈ S j there are 2m copies of W(vi,a j);
• for each i≤ q, there are m copies of W(b,vi);• m(t +6) copies of W(b,p).
The set of votes P2 set the initial score differences between the
candidates. Let sbase(P2) = m(m(7t +5−q)+(mt2)+2m(t +6)).
• for each i≤ q, there are 2m ·occ(i)+mt +4m copies of W(d,vi);• for each j ≤ t, there are mt copies of W(d,a j);• 2m(t +6) copies of W(d,b).
This gives the candidates the following scores for the votes in P2:
s(vi,P2) = sbase(P2)− (2m ·occ(i)+mt +4m)
s(a j,P2) = sbase(P2)− (mt)
s(p,P2) = sbase(P2)
s(b,P2) = sbase(P2)−2m(t +6)
s(d,P2) = sbase(P2)+m(7t +5−q)+(mt2)+2m(t +6).
This modification gives us the following combined Borda scores
for all the candidates (assuming sbase = P1∪P2):
s(vi,P) = sbase(P)−m(t +5)
s(a j,P) = sbase(P)−m(t +6)
s(p,P) = sbase(P)−m(t +6)
s(b,P) = sbase(P)+mq−m(t +6)
s(d,P) = sbase(P)+m(7t +5−q)+(mt2)+2m(t +6).
Now all candidates in A are tied with p in the first round and
therefore the tie-breaking rule must choose one to remove in each
round. In round 4k = 0, . . . ,q/3 we must select some set of candi-
dates a1, . . . ,aq/3 to eliminate (in the interleaving rounds 4k+1,4k+
2,4k+3, the elements vi in the set S j corresponding to a j will drop
out). At each 4k, p will be tied with the remaining candidates in A
which correspond to sets S until there are no more sets to cover (after
4q/3 rounds). Then p will be tied with b if and only if we have elimi-
nated a cover and the remaining a j that were not part of the cover. We
then select p to win over b. There is a solution to the X3C instance
if and only if there is a selection of q/3 elements of A that exactly
cover the elements of V . 
We move on to the Coombs rule which successively eliminates the
candidate with the largest number of last place votes.
Theorem 6 The control by tie-breaking problem for Coombs rule is
NP-complete.
Proof. (Sketch) The result holds for both the simplified and unsim-
plified Coombs rule. Starting from Theorem 3 in Davies et al. [12]
which shows that the manipulation problem for Coombs is NP-
complete we modify the profile E to show hardness. With a slight
modification of the scores, increasing the initial veto scores of s2
and d0 by 1 each, we move the burden from the manipulator to the
tie-breaking rule. The profile E, generally, creates a voting instance
where a cover is selected and then verified through sequential elim-
inations through a complex setting of initial candidate scores (see
Table 1 in [12]). Here, we need to show that the influence that a
single manipulator has on the outcome of the election can be again
simulated by the tie-breaking rule.
We observe that the manipulator only changes the outcome of a
round in two cases: (1) when two candidates are tied to select the
loser during the first 4m rounds and the manipulator can only change
the outcome of E at rounds p ∈ {1,5,9, . . . ,4m}, where exactly two
candidates are tied [12]. The first case is when two candidates a and
b are tied so that a static tie-breaking rule should be used to decide
the loser of this round. The manipulator ranks a (or b) at the bottom
of his preference profile and decides which candidate is eliminated
at this round regardless of the tie-breaking rule.
This case occurs m times during the first 4m rounds in the proof
in [12]. The manipulator can only change the outcome of E at rounds
p ∈ {1,5,9, . . . ,4m}, where exactly two candidates are tied. In this
case, we can simulate the manipulator’s influence using the tie-
breaking rule. (2) Where we increase the veto-score of a some candi-
date a to tie him with a candidate b so that the static tie-breaking rule
eliminates b at this round. This occurs after all d1, . . . ,dn are elimi-
nated (when there is a cover) allowing the elimination of d0 and after
d0,d1 . . . ,dn are eliminated, the score of c is the same as the score of
s2.
Increasing the initial scores of d0 and s2 by 1 means d0 and c are
tied after d1, . . . ,dn are eliminated and the tie-breaking rule can be
used to eliminate d0. Additionally, c and s2 have the same score and
we can eliminate s2 before c with the tie-breaking rule. The elimina-
tion order at the 4th stage is independent of the manipulator’s vote.
Hence, p wins the election if and only if we select a cover during
the first 4m rounds by means of breaking ties appropriately. Hence,
control by tie-breaking for Coombs is NP-complete. 
The construction in the proof of Theorem 6 can be used to state
the following corollary for the (unsimplified) Coombs rule.
Corollary 1 The control by tie-breaking problem for the Coombs
rule is NP-complete.
5.2 Cup and Copeland
Cup and Copeland are often used in real life settings involving sports
or other competitions where ties must be resolved on the fly. Under
Cup all ties must be resolved before the next round can be computed.
In Copeland, when we only select a winner from the set of elements
tied with highest Copeland score, we fall under the result of The-
orem 3. However, when Copeland is used in a sports competition,
often pairwise ties between candidates need to be resolved before
the final Copeland score can be computed (i.e., NCAA football).
To determine the best tie-breaking order for Cup we can use the
algorithm from Theorem 2 in [11] that computes a manipulating vote
and use the returned manipulation as the linear order for tie-breaking.
Theorem 7 The control by tie-breaking problem for the Cup rule is
polynomial when each candidate appears only once in S.
Notice that the above procedure always returns a linear tie-
breaking order. When each candidate appears only once, a manipu-
lator cannot benefit by breaking ties with an order that violates tran-
sitivity. To profit from a non-transitive order, we would need multi-
ple pairwise comparisons between candidates. For example, in dou-
ble elimination tournaments such as the Australian Rules Football
League Finals Series, candidates appear twice. We only need a lin-
ear schedule and one candidate to appear twice to see the difference.
Consider the tournament illustrated in Figure 1; in order to select be-
tween a, b, and c to ensure a win for p we must choose a non-linear
order where c > b, b > a and a > c.
If we allow candidates to enter the tournament more than once,
and if the tournament can have arbitrary shape, the control by tie-
breaking problem becomes hard.
Figure 1. Pairwise relation and Cup graph illustrating that it is possible
to increase the chances for control if we allow the chair to specify a non-
transitive tie-breaking order.
Theorem 8 When the Cup schedule S can have arbitrary shape and
candidates can appear more than once, control by tie-breaking is
NP-complete.
Proof. We reduce from an instance of 3SAT where we are given
a set of clauses K = {k1, . . . ,kn} and a set of literals with their nega-
tions L = {l1, l1, . . . , lm, lm} and asked to find an assignment to every
literal, either l1 or l1 such that every clause in K is satisfied.
Given an instance of 3SAT, we create a Cup tournament with can-
didates C = K ∪ L∪{p}. The pairwise relation between the candi-
dates in the cup has p defeating all elements of L; each literal and its
negation are tied and each literal and its negation defeat any literal
with a higher number (l1 ∼ l1 > l2 ∼ l2); each clause is defeated by
only those literals that would satisfy it while defeating all other liter-
als and p. We construct S, the cup tournament, as follows: for each
ki we pair the three literals that would satisfy ki with their negations
in a sub-cup where each literal matches against its negation in the
first round. In the second to fourth round of the sub-cup ki plays the
winner of each of these three literal vs. literal match-ups, sequen-
tially. We then compose each of these sub-cups, for each ki such that
p faces the winner of each of the sub-cups sequentially. Thus every
literal plays the clause that contains it and every clause plays p.
The manipulator must select a tie-breaking order for each pair of
literals and their negations. If there is a tie-breaking order which se-
lects either l1 or l1 for every literal such that all clauses are satisfied,
then p will win the Cup. Each ki will face each literal or negation in
ki, depending on the tie-breaking rule. Since only literals that satisfy
ki defeat it, one must be selected, otherwise p will lose to ki when p
plays the winner of each of the sub-tournaments. If ki is satisfied by
one (or more) of its literals, then ki will be eliminated and a literal
will face (and lose to) p in the latter part of the tournament. Hence p
will win the tournament if and only if there is tie-breaking rule that
satisfies the 3SAT instance. 
For the Copeland rule, we know that the second-order tie-breaking
rule is NP-hard to manipulate [5]. We can also devise other tie-
breaking rules to add to Copeland to make manipulation NP-hard
[24]. On the other hand, the regular Copeland rule is vulnerable to
control by breaking ties. Here we consider the variant of Copeland
often used in conjunction with sports tournaments where we must
resolve ties in the pairwise graph before we resolve any ties related
to the total Copeland score (e.g., Olympic Ice Hockey). This prob-
lem is closely related to the possible winner problem when there
are partially specified preference profiles [33]. If we require that the
tie-breaking rule be transitive then we can use the algorithm from
Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [5] which provides a score minimizing
the maximum score of all other candidates to set the tie-break order.
Allowing the tie-breaking rule to be non-transitive increases the
potential for control of the tie-breaking rule under Copeland. Con-
sider the election with the following 6 votes: (d, f ,g, p,a,b,c),
(d, f ,g, p,c,b,a), 2× (p,a,b,c,d, f ,g), and 2× (c,b,a,d, f ,g, p).
Suppose we want p to win. The Copeland score of the candidates
(denoted s(c)) are s(p) = s(a) = s(b) = s(c) = s(d) = s(3),s( f ) =
2,s(g) = 0. We need to submit a tie-breaking order that will resolve
the pairwise ties between a,b and c. There is no transitive order that
we can submit to resolve these such that p wins. However, we can
submit pairwise preferences that will maintain the cycle and allow p
to win with an additional point over g.
We note that such tie-breaking is closely to the problem of ma-
nipulating a Copeland election with irrational voters [14] which is
polynomial time computable [16]. If we allow the chair to specify
the result of each pair-wise tie separately (and thus to break ties
non-transitively), Copeland remains vulnerable to control by break-
ing ties. This problem is closely related to the problem of finding
possible winners in a tournament that is partially specified [3]. We
can use the algorithm presented in Theorem 5.2 from Faliszewski et
al. [16] which allows us to find an assignment to the pairwise rela-
tionship between all the non-p candidates to minimize their scores.
Corollary 2 The control by tie-breaking problem for Copeland is
polynomial, even when tie-breaking is specified in terms of a non-
transitive ordering on pairwise contests.
6 COMBINING VOTING RULES
We have seen many rules are vulnerable to control by breaking ties
when there is only one opportunity to break ties. Conversely, we have
seen that some rules are resistant when many tie-breaks are required.
This leaves open the question of what happens when only a small,
fixed number of tie-breaks are required. Interestingly, we show that
in these cases, rules can be resistant to control by tie-breaking.
Theorem 9 There exists a two stage voting rule based on veto and
plurality where the control by tie-breaking problem is NP-complete.
Proof. We consider the rule that first eliminates half the candidates
using the veto rule, then elects the plurality winner. Clearly, the con-
trol problem is in NP. We select the subset of candidates through tie-
breaking for the runoff. To show NP-hardness, we adapt the reduction
from X3C used in the proof of Theorem 3 in [6] that demonstrates
control by elimination of candidates for plurality is NP-hard.
Given two sets V = {v1, . . . ,vm} and S = {S1, . . . ,Sn}, this reduc-
tion uses n + 4m/3 + 2 candidates where m is the size of the set
being covered, n is the number of 3-element sets from which the
cover is built: p is the preferred candidate, w is the current winner, si,
i = 1, . . . ,n are candidates that correspond to sets Si, v j, j = 1, . . . ,m
represent the elements of V ; fk, k = 1, . . . ,m/3 are additional can-
didates. We double the number of candidates to 2n+8m/3+4 with
n+4m/3+2 additional dummy candidates di that occur in the same
fixed order in every vote. The first n + m + 1 candidates appear at
the front of the votes, whilst the last m/3+1 appear at the end. The
unlisted candidates are ranked in an arbitrary order between the can-
didates fm/3 and dm+n+2.
• for i = 1, . . . ,n: 1 vote (d1  . . . dn+m+1  si  c  f1  . . .
fm/3  . . . dn+m+2  . . . dn+4m/3+2)
• for i= 1, . . . ,n and v ji ∈ Si, j = 1,2,3: 1 vote (d1 . . . dn+m+1
si  v ji  f1  . . . fm/3  . . . dn+m+2  . . . dn+4m/3+2).
• m/3−1 votes (d1  . . . dn+m+1  w f1  . . . fm/3  . . .
dn+m+2  . . . dn+4m/3+2)
• for j = 1, . . . ,m: m/3− 2 votes (d1  . . .  dn+m+1  v j  f1 
. . . fm/3  . . . dn+m+2  . . . dn+4m/3+2).
With our two stage rule, one of the dummy candidates, dn+4m/3+2,
has all the vetoes so will be eliminated. The chair therefore has to
tie-break and select, sequentially, n + 4m/3 + 2 of the remaining
2n+ 8m/3+ 3 candidates. We start with W = C \ {dn+4m/3+2} and
apply the tie-breaking rule sequentially m/2 times. At each step we
select some candidate, T (W,P) = ci, then re-apply the tie-breaking
rule on the set T (W \{ci},P), continuing until we select a set of the
correct size for the second round. To ensure that the distinguished
candidate is the plurality winner, the chair’s tie-breaking must elim-
inate all n+m+ 1 dummy candidates at the front of the vote, plus
m/3 of the candidates from the original election corresponding to
the cover. Hence, the X3C problem has a solution if and only if the
chair can tie-break to ensure the distinguished candidate wins. 
Conitzer and Sandholm [10] give a general construction that builds
a two-stage voting rule that often makes it intractable to compute a
manipulating vote. This construction runs one round of the Cup rule,
eliminating half of the candidates, and then applies the original base
rule to the candidates that remain. For the base rule X , we denote this
as Cup1 +X . The control by tie-breaking problem is also typically
intractable for such two-stage voting rules. Adapting Theorem 2 in
Conitzer and Sandholm [10] we can make the following statement.
Theorem 10 The control by tie-breaking problem for Cup1 +
Plurality, Cup1 +Borda, and Cup1 +Maximin are NP-complete.
Proof. Consider the reduction from SAT used in Theorem 2 in
Conitzer and Sandholm [10] showing that it is NP-hard to con-
struct a single vote to ensure a distinguished candidate wins Cup1 +
Plurality. This reduction sets up a profile in which the candidates
c+v and c−v corresponding to a literal and its negation which are
paired in the first round of a Cup and are tied. The construction of
the Cup is similar to the one described in Theorem 8. There is a vote
that breaks these ties so that the distinguished candidate wins if and
only if the SAT instance is satisfiable. Let us consider just the origi-
nal profile, without the single manipulating vote. Now, the chair can
break these ties so that the distinguished candidate wins if and only
the SAT instance is satisfiable. The other proofs are similar and are
adapted from reductions in [10]. 
Elkind and Lipmaa [13] generalize this construction to run a num-
ber of rounds, k, of some rule before calling a second rule; making
computing a manipulating vote NP-hard in many cases. Control by
tie-breaking for such hybrids is often NP-hard as tie-breaking can
simulate the manipulating vote used in the proofs in Elkind and Lip-
maa [13]. For example, control by tie-breaking for HYB(STVk,Y )
and HYB(Y,STVk) is NP-hard, where Y is one of: plurality, Borda,
maximin or Cup. Interestingly, HYB(pluralityk, plurality) is vulner-
able to manipulation [13] and manipulation is polynomial if k is
bounded; this result carries to our problem. However, this hybrid is
resistant to control by tie-breaking for unbounded k.
Theorem 11 The control by tie-breaking problem for
HYB(Pluralityk,Plurality) is polynomial if k or m− k is bounded.
Proof. If k is bounded, we can try all O(mk) possible tie-
breaking decisions about candidates to eliminate. Similarly, if m− k
is bounded, we can try all O(mm−k) possible tie-breaking decisions
about candidates to survive. 
Theorem 12 The control by tie-breaking problem for
HYB(Pluralityk,Plurality) if k is unbounded is NP-complete
and polynomial if k or m− k is bounded.
Proof. If k is bounded, we can try all O(mk) possible tie-breaking
decisions about candidates to eliminate or all O(mm−k) possible tie-
breaking decisions about candidates to survive if m− k is bounded.
When k is unbounded our construction is similar to the construc-
tion in the proof of Theorem 3 in Elkind and Lipmaa [13]. We reduce
from an instance of the X3C problem where each item occurs in at
most 3 subsets. We are given a set of items V = {v1, . . . ,vm} with
|V | = m and subsets S1,S2, . . . ,Sn ⊂ V with |Si| = 3 for i = 1, . . . ,n.
The question is whether there exists an index set I with |I| = m/3
and
⋃
i∈I Si = S. We build an election with n + m + 2 candidates:
C = V ∪S∪{p,d}. We have m candidates V = {v1, . . . ,vm} that en-
code items, n candidates S = {s1, . . . ,sn} that encode sets, a dummy
candidate d and the preferred candidate p. Let T be a constant≥ 3nm.
We introduce the following two sets of votes, P = P1 ∪ P2. We
denote Si = {s j|vi ∈ S j}. The first set P1 contains the following votes:
• for each vi, i = 1, . . . ,m: T votes (pC \{p})
• for each vi, i = 1, . . . ,m: T −2 votes (vi C \{vi})
• for each Si, i = 1, . . . ,m: 3 votes (Si  vi C \Si)
• 4 votes (d C \{d})
To build P2, let n j be the number of first places occupied by s j in
P1, thus n j ≤ 3. We introduce 3− n j votes (s j  d  C \ {s j,d}).
The rest of the votes are irrelevant. Thus, the initial plurality scores
of the candidates are: score(p) = T , score(vi) = T −2, i = 1, . . . ,m,
score(s j) = 3, j = 1, . . . ,n and score(d) = 4. We set k = n−m/3.
During the first n−m/3 rounds, n−m/3 candidates from S are
eliminated and the tie-breaking rule decides which n−m/3 out of m
candidates to eliminate as all n candidates in S are tied. If the remain-
ing m/3 candidates in S are not a cover, then an uncovered item vi
gets 3 points resulting in a plurality score of T + 1. Hence, p loses.
Therefore, tie-breaking must ensure that the remaining candidates
from S form a cover. Finally, if a valid cover is selected, the maximal
plurality score of d after k rounds is 4+ 3n, the maximal plurality
score of any surviving s j is 9, the maximal plurality score of vi is
T −2 and the score of p is T . Hence, p wins iff there is a cover. 
7 CONCLUSION
We have studied the computational complexity of the control by tie-
breaking problem. This problem is equivalent to the problem of de-
ciding the winner of an election under PUT. When the chair is only
asked to choose between the co-winners, the problem is trivially
polynomial. However, in multi-round elections, where the chair may
have to break multiple ties, we proved that this control problem can
be NP-complete, and the form of the tie-breaking function can in-
crease the opportunities for control. Table 1 provides a summary of
these results.
P NP-complete
scoring rules, Cup, STV, Baldwin
Nanson, Copeland, maximin ranked pairs,
Bucklin, fallback, Schulze Coombs
Kemeny-Young (m≤ 3) Kemeny-Young (m≥ 3)
Table 1. Complexity of control by tie-breaking. The result for ranked pairs
is due to [8] and the result for STV is due to [9].
Interestingly, with a two-stage voting rule, even though the chair
might only be asked to break ties at most twice, control by tie-braking
can be NP-hard. Of course, many of our results are worst-case and
may not reflect the difficulty of manipulation in practice. A number
of recent theoretical and empirical results suggest that manipulation
can often be computationally easy on average (e.g. [17, 20, 25, 29–
32]). We intend to explore the hardness of control by tie-breaking
using data from PrefLib [21] and other sources.
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